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This paper utilizes option pricing theory to analyze bank stock prices as one
method of estimating fair variable deposit insurance premium rates in
accordance with individual bank default risk, and conducts empirical
analyses using Japanese data.
The purpose of the analyses is to discuss the framework of public organs’
delegate monitoring of bank management. One of the functions of the
deposit insurance system is such monitoring. The present system in the
United States incorporates the subjective judgment of a bank supervisor
combined with certain objective criteria for setting premium rates. There is
a need to analyze the types of methodologies that might be viewed as
options for adoption in Japan. 
To determine whether setting premium rates based on stock price infor-
mation is a valid and stable approach, comparative analysis is conducted
on the results of trial calculations utilizing this method versus other bank
management indexes (credit ratings, etc.), and case analyses are carried out
on failed banks. The conclusion is that while this method does involve a
certain valuation error, it is an effective means of identifying banks with
bad conditions. Moreover, the results confirm that by making adjustments
for the changes in market expectations regarding the forbearance of the
supervisory authorities, the accuracy of the estimates can be improved.
Finally, this paper considers the impact on bank management that could be
expected if this method were actually adopted.
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I. Introduction
This paper examines a method of estimating fair premium rates for deposit insurance
(hereinafter referred to as “insurance rates”) in accordance with the default risk on
deposits (the bank default risk). Specifically, the examination is centered around
empirical analyses of a method of estimating the insurance rates based on bank stock
price information utilizing option pricing theory.
Under the present deposit insurance systems in Japan and many other nations, in
principle all banks are obligated to subscribe, so a uniform flat insurance rate is
charged to all banks regardless of the contents of their portfolios or their manage-
ment conditions. The problem with this arrangement is that it does not provide 
sufficient disincentives preventing banks from taking excessive risks in an effort to
realize high profit ratios (engaging in high-risk, high-return fund management), even
though it is known that this increases the likelihood of default. Despite this flaw, to
date the vast majority of deposit insurance systems in most countries have been based
on flat insurance rates. Many economists have long argued that insurance rates
should be charged in accordance with bank risk, if at all possible (and that a variable
insurance rate system should be introduced to this end). Among economists, the
debate is whether or not it is possible for third parties (i.e., investors, analysts, 
regulatory authorities including deposit insurance organs, etc.) to accurately grasp 
the contents of banks’ assets (market prices and risk).
This paper examines the option pricing theory approach, which is considered to
be a strong candidate method for the estimation of fair insurance rates, by analyzing
the estimation results for Japanese banks. There are no clear criteria for judging the
accuracy of the estimated insurance rates, and it is difficult to test statistically.
Nevertheless, various aspects of this issue are considered herein, including compara-
tive analyses with other information related to the status of bank management as well
as case analyses of failed financial institutions. While this paper takes the approach of
analyzing problems with deposit insurance systems, from another perspective one
might say that it also examines the issue of the extent to which the information
included in bank stock prices (the information context) reflects the actual conditions
of bank management.
This paper is organized as follows. Prior to beginning the actual analyses of insur-
ance rates, Chapter II examines and summarizes the original functions of deposit
insurance and discusses the insurance rate systems actually being used in Japan and
the United States. Chapter III presents methodologies for estimating insurance rates
using the option pricing theory approach: the Merton method, the Marcus and
Shaked method, and the Ronn and Verma method. Chapter IV reports the results of
the empirical analyses, and this represents the core of this paper. These analyses can
be broadly divided into estimations of the insurance rates given the forbearance
expectations, and estimations of the insurance rates after estimating the expectations
themselves. Finally, Chapter V presents some concluding remarks.135
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II. Functions of Deposit Insurance and Review of Present
Systems
A. Functions of Deposit Insurance
Prior to addressing the issue of deposit insurance premium rates, this section reviews
the functions and roles of deposit insurance.
1
In a number of nations, deposit insurance is operated on a monopoly basis
directly by the government or by government-affiliated organs rather than by private-
sector insurance companies, and in many cases the banks are obligated to subscribe.
Thus, deposit insurance may be interpreted as a type of government intervention in
the banking industry. In general, government intervention is deemed justified when
an appropriate allocation of resources cannot be realized by relying exclusively on the
free market (so-called “market failures”). In the case of deposit insurance, because
there is an extremely large asymmetry in information between the banks and the
depositors (especially small-lot depositors), from the standpoint of the social costs
involved, it is considered inappropriate for the depositors to personally monitor the
management conditions of the banks and select where they will deposit their funds in
accordance with the principle of self-accountability. Accordingly, from the perspec-
tive of economics, the primary justification for the existence of deposit insurance is
the delegate monitoring function whereby the government (deposit insurance organ)
monitors the status of bank management on behalf of the depositors.
2 Moreover,
based on the results of this monitoring, the government should then take appropriate
action on behalf of the depositors.
3
Then what types of actions are appropriate for governments to pursue based on
the results of monitoring the management conditions of banks? Theoretically, if one
were to make the major assumption that governments have complete access to all
information and can accurately judge the status of bank management in all cases
without fail, the goal could be achieved simply by having the government announce
whether each individual bank’s management conditions are sound, and there 
would be no need to set risk-adjusted variable insurance rates. (This is because if 
governments had access to all information, no risk would occur in the first place.) 
In practical terms, however, there is a certain asymmetry of information between 
1. The contents of this section are not limited to ideas for which a general consensus has been reached, but also
include the personal opinions of the author.
2. The protection of small-lot depositors is often cited as the objective of deposit insurance. In line with the logic of
this paper, the act of reducing the possibility that depositors may unintentionally deposit their funds in banks with
poor management conditions itself may be interpreted as the protection of depositors. 
Additionally, the function of guaranteeing deposits by such actions as paying off depositors in the unlikely
event of bank failure may also be viewed as having the function of depositor protection. In this paper, however,
this is considered as part of the post-failure disposal process, and does not constitute the primary purpose of
deposit insurance.
It is also a fact that in Japan and other nations the present deposit insurance systems sometimes fulfill certain
roles in maintaining the stability of the financial system and conducting appropriate disposal of failed financial
institutions. However, this paper makes a clear distinction between such roles and the original functions of deposit
insurance, and does not address these types of ancillary functions. 
3. In addition to deposit insurance, types of intervention whereby the government monitors banks on behalf of the
depositors and takes appropriate action include early resolution and prompt corrective action. The question of
which approach represents the optimal system is an important issue, but it lies outside the scope of this paper.governments and the banks, and governments must accept a certain level of judg-
ment error (risk) in their assessments of bank management conditions.
4 Considering
this point, for example, just as institutional investors demand a risk premium when
they invest in bonds, governments should also demand risk premiums from each
bank on behalf of the depositors. Based on the assumption that the government’s risk
monitoring cost would be lower than that for monitoring by each individual deposi-
tor, the premium demanded by the government would be less than the premium
demanded by depositors if there were no deposit insurance, so from a macroeco-
nomic standpoint the social cost would be reduced. Considering this argument in
light of the purpose of deposit insurance, the implication is that fair insurance rates
should be set for each bank in accordance with the individual bank risk.
Can fair insurance rates therefore be set based on the subjective evaluation of the
government (evaluations via bank inspections, etc.)? The answer to this question
depends on two factors. First, is the information held by the government absolutely
superior to that held by other parties? This paper makes the a priori assumption that
while the government holds information that is not available anywhere else, market
prices also incorporate information that the government has not taken notice of, and
thus government and market information are mutually complementary. Second, even
assuming that the information held by the government is absolutely superior, the
problem is that there is no guarantee that the discretionary policy decisions will
always incorporate optimal conclusions. While this paper does not enter into a theo-
retical examination of this point, as one intuitive example, the government may have
some incentive to monitor the situation for a while and give the banks a chance to
revive themselves rather than simply liquidating failed banks. (When failed banks
successfully recover financial soundness, the government averts the danger of having
its responsibility for supervising banks called into question.) One means of com-
pensating for this latent bias is to incorporate certain objective evaluation standards
or rules (such as evaluation based on stock prices, which is the main subject of 
this paper, or evaluation based on capital adequacy ratios, which is adopted in the
United States) in the process of setting insurance rates, instead of leaving this to 
the discretion of government authorities.
Keeping the above reasoning in mind, the following sections examine the 
validity of using stock price information and option pricing theory as one method of
objective evaluation.
B. Prior Research on Variable Deposit Insurance Rates
A great deal of research has been conducted on ideal deposit insurance systems. This
section presents a brief introduction to a few papers that consider the setting of 
variable insurance rates.
To begin with, there are basically two opinions as to whether the government 
has access to sufficient information to set fair, risk-adjusted insurance rates. The 
first position is that, because the government cannot gain access to the private 
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4. The fact that the problem of moral hazard is frequently cited under flat insurance rate systems suggests that there
are limits to governments’ access to information.information held by banks, in practice it is not possible to make accurate judgments
of banks’ management conditions. Among researchers who accept this premise, some
believe that by constructing mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatible constraints,
it would be possible to achieve the same effect as by charging risk-adjusted insurance
rates.
5 The second position is that by effectively utilizing all types of information 
the government can, to some extent, effectively grasp the management conditions 
of banks. In this case, the main concern is how to set risk-neutral insurance rates 
(a system in which the relative size of the insurance rates corresponds to the relative
size of the risk), or how to set fair insurance rates (a system in which the absolute
level of the insurance rates corresponds to the absolute level of the risk).
6 The topic 
of this paper, estimating fair insurance rates using option pricing theory based on
bank stock price information, belongs to the latter line of thought.
The following chapter introduces three papers from the United States on methods
for calculating insurance rates using option theory (the Merton method, the Marcus
and Shaked method, and the Ronn and Verma method). First, let us examine three
Japanese research papers that employ these calculation methods. In what is con-
sidered the first Japanese paper regarding this theme, Omura (1986) employs the
Merton method, calculates fair insurance rates for 13 city banks as of September
1985, and compares them with the insurance rate charged in Japan at that time 
(a flat rate of 0.012 percent). Ikeo (1991a, b) calculates fair insurance rates for 53 of
Japan’s nationwide banks at two points in time—the end of September 1985 and the
end of March 1986—based on the Ronn and Verma method, and argues that on
average the actual rate charged (0.012 percent) functions as a subsidy (that is, on
average the rate charged is too low compared with the fair rates).
7 Most recently,
(while they do not estimate fair insurance rates), Saito and Moridaira (1998) utilize
the framework of the Merton method to calculate the probability that banks will fall
into a net debt position. Specifically, they estimate the probabilities of 119 banks
falling into a net debt position on a daily basis from April 1995 through March
1998, and conduct analyses on the transition of these probability figures.
In contrast with these earlier research efforts, the main distinctive characteristics
of the empirical analysis in this paper (Chapter IV) may be summarized as follows.
(1) The Ronn and Verma method is adopted, and the estimations also make
adjustments for the forbearance expectations effect (Section IV.C).
(2) The fair insurance rates are estimated at the individual bank level and,
although this is anecdotal, considerations are also given to the validity of the
estimates (Section IV.B).
(3) A practical perspective is adopted as consideration is given to the types of
administration that could realistically be used if this method were actually
incorporated into Japan’s deposit insurance system (Section IV.D).
(4) The analysis period is long term, covering the post-“bubble” era from the end
of March 1990 through the end of March 1998 (Section IV.B).
137
Estimating Fair Premium Rates for Deposit Insurance Using Option Pricing Theory
5. For example, refer to Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992).
6. Refer to Iwamura (1992) for a discussion of risk-neutral insurance rates and fair insurance rates.
7. Ikeo (1991a, b) assumed, a priori, that the value of the forbearance expectations parameter r, which is explained in
chapters III and IV of this paper, is 0.97. This paper expands on this point, and attempts to estimate the fair
insurance rates after estimating the value of r itself.C. Current Deposit Insurance Rates in Japan and the United States
This section presents an outline of the deposit insurance rate systems currently used
in Japan and the United States as preliminary information prior to the analyses using
actual data in Chapter IV.
1. Deposit insurance rates in Japan
In Japan, the deposit insurance system covers banks,
8 shinkin banks, credit coopera-
tives and labor credit associations with headquarters located in Japan. Deposits are
insured for up to ¥10 million in principle per financial institution for funds
deposited in the types of accounts that are insured.
9 Through March 1996, all 
financial institutions were charged a flat insurance rate of 0.012 percent as a general
insurance premium, but from April 1996 the insurance rate has been 0.048 percent
as a general insurance premium plus 0.036 percent as a special insurance premium,
10
for a total premium rate of 0.084 percent.
2. Deposit insurance rates in the United States
In the United States, Section 302(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “FDICIA”) mandated the
introduction of risk-related premiums, and these have actually been applied since
1994.
11 As shown in Table 1, the core of this system is the classification of banks into
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8. City banks, regional banks, member banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks, trust banks, long-term
credit banks, etc.
9. The types of accounts insured are current-account deposits, ordinary deposits, deposits at notice, deposits for 
tax payments, saving deposits, time deposits, installment savings, special deposits, installments, and money in
trust with guaranteed repayment of principal (including loans in trust), as well as installment asset accumulation
products utilizing the above-mentioned types of accounts. Foreign currency deposits and negotiable certificates of
deposit are not covered by the insurance system.
10. The special insurance premium is a temporary measure that will expire in fiscal 2000.
11. For an outline of the FDICIA and considerations on Japanese financial system, refer to Okina (1993), for example.
Table 1  Deposit Insurance Premium Rates in the United States (Fiscal 1996)
Basis points
Supervisory groups





Well capitalized 0 3 17
adequacy Adequately capitalized 3 10 24
Undercapitalized 10 24 27
Savings Association
Supervisory groups




Well capitalized 23 26 29
adequacy Adequately capitalized 26 29 30
Undercapitalized 29 30 31
Note: The capital adequacy categories are defined by a combination of three criteria: (1) the capital 
(Tier 1) adequacy ratio under the Basle Agreement; (2) the capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) adequacy ratio
under the Basle Agreement; and (3) the leverage ratio (the capital [Tier 1 + Tier 2] divided by total
assets). Financial institutions are categorized as “well capitalized” when (1) is at least 6.0 percent,
(2) is at least 10.0 percent, and (3) is at least 5.0 percent. Financial institutions are categorized 
as “adequately capitalized” when (1) is at least 4.0 percent, (2) is at least 8.0 percent, and (3) is at
least 4.0 percent. Financial institutions are categorized as “undercapitalized” when (1) is less
than 4.0 percent, (2) is less than 8.0 percent, or (3) is less than 4.0 percent.a total of nine risk categories by capital adequacy (three categories) and the evaluation
of the supervisory authority (three categories) together with the setting of different
insurance rates for each risk category.
12 The insurance rates charged for each category
may be revised (in fact, the premiums were revised twice [downward] between the
time the system was first applied in January 1994 and the time the rates shown in
Table 1 were implemented). At present, the vast majority of financial institutions are
rated in the top risk category (“well capitalized” under the capital adequacy ratings
and an “A” evaluation from the supervisory authority). Specifically, as of the end 
of 1996, 95.0 percent of the institutions were placed in the top risk category by 
the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), and 89.9 percent were placed in this category 
by the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). Thus, only a small number of 
institutions presently fall into the eight other risk categories.
III. Methods for Calculating Fair Premium Rates for Deposit
Insurance Using Option Pricing Theory
This chapter presents a summary of three methods for calculating fair insurance
rates
13 applying option pricing theory: (1) the Merton method (Merton [1977]); 
(2) the Marcus and Shaked method (Marcus and Shaked [1984]); and (3) the Ronn
and Verma method (Ronn and Verma [1986, 1989]). Method (2) may be considered
as an improved version of method (1), and method (3) may be considered as an
improved version of method (2). The empirical analyses in Chapter IV utilize
method (3).
A. Merton Method
Merton (1977) adopts the Black-Scholes option pricing theory for the calculation of
fair insurance rates, as follows. From the viewpoint of the body providing deposit
insurance, the required cash flow G at the time of maturity T of the insured bank’s
liabilities (for simplification, a single type of discount bond is assumed) may be
defined as follows.
G = max (0, B – V). (1)
Here, V is the value of the bank’s assets and B is the face value of the bank’s 
liabilities. Consequently, G expresses the bank’s net liabilities, and the deposit 
insurance is obligated to cover this. Taking B as a constant and V as a stochastic 
variable, equation (1) may be interpreted as expressing the payoff on a European put
option where the value of the bank’s assets V is the underlying asset and the face value
of the bank’s liabilities B the exercise price. Therefore, in determining the value of
insurance, assuming that the value of the bank’s assetsV follows a lognormal process
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12. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997).
13. For terminological convenience, estimated insurance rates using option pricing theory based on bank stock price
information are referred to as “fair insurance rates.” (Of course, further examinations would be required to 
determine whether or not the estimation results are really fair.)(with a volatility of sv), the option theory pricing equation (the Black-Scholes 
formula) can be applied. In this case, the fair insurance premium P may be calculated
as follows.
P = Be
–rT N (x + svÖT ) –VN (x)
B 1 (2) 1n— – (r + – – s
2
v)T
V 2 where x º ———————— —.
svÖT
Here, r expresses the risk-free interest rate.
14 The function N(•) is the cumulative
probability density function for a standard normal distribution. In equation (2), 
V and sv are unknowns, and the fair insurance rates can be determined by seeking
their values.
B. Marcus and Shaked Method
Marcus and Shaked (1984) make certain revisions to the Merton method and 
conduct empirical analyses on U.S. bank stock price data.
As for the computational method, the Marcus and Shaked method differs from
the Merton method in two ways. First, Marcus and Shaked note that the value of
bank assets differs before and after a bank obtains deposit insurance. Specifically, they
define V as the value of bank assets before the bank obtains deposit insurance. If P is
the value of the deposit insurance, then the value of the bank assets after the bank
obtains deposit insurance may be expressed as V+ P. Marcus and Shaked assume that
V is a stochastic variable that follows a lognormal process (with a volatility of sv), and
using equation (1) as a starting point the value of the deposit insurance P (the fair
insurance rate) can be derived by applying the Black-Scholes formula as follows.
P = Be
–rT N (x + svÖT ) –Ve
–dTN (x)
B 1 (3) 1n— – (r – d + – – s
2
v)T
V 2 where x º ————————— —.
svÖT
Here, B is the face value of the bank’s liabilities, r is the risk-free interest rate, and
the function N(•) is the cumulative probability density function for a standard 
normal distribution. Equation (3) is basically equivalent to equation (2), but 
inasmuch as equation (3) clearly incorporates the effect whereby internal reserves
decrease through stock dividend distributions (the dividend rate is defined as d), it is
a generalized version of equation (2).
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14. Under the Merton method, the result includes the risk-free interest rate but does not include the risk premium
because in asset valuation theory with no arbitrage condition the return on a risk-free composite portfolio must
equal the risk-free interest rate. In contrast, some analysts (such as Moridaira [1997]) argue that because there are
no securities or markets for trading in the asset values V of banks (or more broadly, of corporations) themselves,
it is inappropriate to further develop this line of reasoning, and that the expected growth rates of the assets or
some other factor should be used in place of the risk-free interest rate. However, it should also be noted that in
practice it is difficult to estimate risk premiums or the expected growth rates of assets.The second point in which the Marcus and Shaked method differs from the
Merton method is as follows. Marcus and Shaked note that equation (2) includes two
unknowns that cannot be directly observed (that is, the value of the bank’s assets V
and the volatility of this variable sv), and introduce the following two relations so
that these unknowns can be estimated. The first equation is
V + P = D + E. (4)
Here, D is the present value of the bank’s liabilities and E is the present value of
the bank’s capital (total equity). Equation (4) may be interpreted as a general relation
showing the balance between assets, liabilities, and capital. In the Merton method,
for simplification, a single type of discount bond is assumed for the liabilities, but
here general bonds are assumed and different variables are given for the face value B
and the present value D. Of course, in actual computations some sort of relationship
must be assumed between B and D. By assuming a bond that pays a risk-free interest
rate r, Marcus and Shaked assume the case in which the present value of the bond is
equal to the face value of the bond, as follows.
V + P = B + E.( 4 ' )
The second relation is
¶E sEE = svV— —. (5)
¶V
This is the result of applying Ito’s lemma (known in stochastic calculus), noting
that the present value of the bank’s capital E is a stochastic variable dependent on 
the value of the bank’s assets V and its volatility sv (that is, E = E(V, sv). Here sE
indicates the volatility of the present value of the bank’s capital E. To rearrange 
equation (5), first equation (3) is substituted into equation (4).
E = V – D + P (6)
= V – D + Be
–rT N (x + svÖT ) –Ve
–dTN (x).
By substituting equation (6) and its differential form into equation (5), the result is
Be
–rT[1 –N(x + svÖT )] sv = sE{1 – ————————— —}. (7)
Ve
–dT[1 –N(x)]
Then the three unknowns P,  V, and sv can be calculated by simultaneously 
solving equations (3), (4'), and (7). In seeking a numerical solution to these simulta-
neous equations, the book value is used for the face value of the bank’s liabilities B,
and the present value of the bank’s capital E is calculated by multiplying the stock
price by the total number of outstanding ordinary shares. The volatility of E(sE) is
estimated from past stock price data.
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for 40 major U.S. banks between 1979 and 1980, and compared these with the 
rates actually being charged by the FDIC (the effective premium rate was
0.077–0.083 percent after adjusting for the effect of rebates). Their conclusion 
was that the fair rates would be less than one-half of the rates charged by the FDIC,
even after accounting for the FDIC’s operating costs, implying that the FDIC was
overpricing its deposit insurance.
C. Ronn and Verma Method
Ronn and Verma (1986, 1989) use the framework of the Marcus and Shaked method
with several modifications. 
Specifically, the Ronn and Verma method has two points in common with the
Marcus and Shaked method. First, Ronn and Verma express the fair insurance rate as
the premium on a put option using the Black-Scholes formula. Second, because the
bank’s asset value and its volatility cannot be observed directly, they estimate these
figures using data on stock prices and stock price volatility, which can be observed.
On the other hand, the Ronn and Verma method differs from the Marcus and
Shaked method in the following four ways. First, they adopt the asset value after the
bank obtains deposit insurance as the underlying asset for the option that determines
the fair insurance rate (in this section, this is referred to as V, and it should be noted
that this definition of V differs from that adopted in Section B above), and assume
that this V is a probability variable that follows a lognormal process. Second, in
accordance with this expression, equation (4) in the Marcus and Shaked method can
be rewritten as V = D + E, but Ronn and Verma do not adopt this relationship, and
instead assume the following relationship.
E =VN(y) – rBN(y – svÖT )
V       1 (8) 1n[— —] + – –s
2
vT
rB       2 where y º ———————.
svÖT
This is consistent with Black and Scholes (1973), who demonstrated that a 
corporation’s (here, a bank’s) capital value can be estimated using the theoretical price
of a call option (the underlying asset is the asset value V and the exercise price is the
future value of the bank’s debt Be
rT, where B is the face value of the bank’s debt).
However, in equation (8), as the exercise price, Be
rT is multiplied by r (0 < r ≤ 1),
and this is the third difference from the Marcus and Shaked method. This takes
account of the common understanding that when a bank falls into a net debt 
position, the supervisory authorities (here the FDIC) may sometimes provide 
financial assistance or otherwise exercise forbearance
15 rather than ordering an 
immediate bank closure. Under this model, a bank closure is not ordered at the
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15. Ronn and Verma (1986) use the phrase “a temporary reprieve from closure,” but here the word “forbearance”—
which is considered more familiar—is used.moment when V equals B (when the bank falls into a net debt position). Rather, 
the bank closure is only ordered when V declines to rB (≤ B). Consequently, the
parameter  r may be interpreted as expressing the market expectations of the 
possibility of financial assistance and/or forbearance by the supervisory authorities
(hereinafter, these are referred to as “forbearance expectations”). Ronn and Verma
conduct most of their numerical analyses at r = 0.97. Also, Ronn and Verma report
that while changing the value of r naturally changes the absolute amount of each
bank’s deposit insurance rate, this results in virtually no change to the relative
amounts of the insurance rates charged to different banks. Like Marcus and Shaked,
Ronn and Verma also utilize the relation in equation (5), but by rearranging 
the equation, instead of the expression in equation (7), they derive the following
equation.
sEE sv= —— —. (9)
VN(y)
This is the result of substituting ¶E/¶V = N(y), which is the result of a partial 
differentiation of equation (8), into equation (5).
Finally, the fourth difference versus the Marcus and Shaked method is that the
framework of the Ronn and Verma method includes both insured liabilities (face
value B1) and uninsured liabilities (face value B2 º B – B1). They use the situation in
which all of the liabilities (face value B) are covered by the deposit insurance. At this
point, the hypothetical deposit insurance premium P' is calculated in the same way
used in the Marcus and Shaked method.
P'=BN(x + svÖT ) –Ve
–dTN(x)
B 1 (10) 1n— + (d – – – s
2
v)T
V 2 where x º ———————— —.
svÖT
Because just B1/B percent of the total liabilities are actually covered by the deposit
insurance, assuming that the seniority of all the liabilities is equal, the deposit 
insurance premium P is calculated as follows.




=B1N(x + svÖT ) –———N(x).
B
This can then be converted into the insurance rate d as follows.




=N(x + svÖT ) –—— —N(x).
B
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simultaneously solving equations (8) and (9).
16 The fair insurance rate can then be
determined by substituting the results into equations (11) and (12). 
IV. Empirical Analyses
In this chapter, fair insurance rates are estimated following the Ronn and Verma
method using stock price data for Japanese banks. The chapter includes considera-
tions of the technical issues regarding the estimation method and an evaluation of the
validity of the estimation results, as well as an examination of the effects that might
be expected if this type of rate structure were actually adopted for the Japanese
deposit insurance system. 
In principle, the objects of the analyses are limited to city banks, long-term credit
banks, trust banks, regional banks, and member banks of the Second Association of
Regional Banks that have adopted the international standards (1988 Basle
Agreement) for disclosure of the capital adequacy information (a total of 87 banks).
17
As necessary, however, some analyses only cover banks that have received credit 
ratings (Moody’s long-term deposit ratings), and the chapter also includes case 
analyses of failed banks. The data used are the stock prices at the end of each
Japanese fiscal year,
18 the outstanding number of shares, total liabilities,
19 and the 
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16. Iteration is used to solve these simultaneous equations in accordance with the following procedure. First, two
new variables are defined for convenience.
a º y
b º y – svÖT.
(FN.1)
The relationships between these new variables and the unknowns may be expressed as follows.





V = rB exp(———). (FN.3)
2
Then the binary simultaneous equations derived from equations (8) and (9) are rewritten using a and b as follows.
sEEÖT a = ————— + b (FN.4)
rBN(b) +E
a – b                    a
2 – b
2
—— rBN(a)exp(———) – sEE = 0. (FN.5)
ÖT                       2
If equation (FN.5) is solved for a and b using the Newtonian method with equation (FN.4) as a condition of
constraint, by substituting the results into equations (FN.2) and (FN.3), the values of the unknowns can then 
be determined.
17. These include some banks that previously adopted the international standards (1988 Basle Agreement) but 
now follow domestic Japanese standards. However, institutions that were already bankrupt by March 1997 are
not included. 
18. In this chapter, the stock prices at the end of each fiscal year are always used for calculating the insurance rates for
each fiscal year. To realize a more stable evaluation for the actual management of the system, however, the use of
the average stock prices during each fiscal year might be considered. Nevertheless, this issue is not considered in
this paper.
19. In these analyses, the book values of the liabilities are adopted as approximations of the present values. Under the
financial accounting for Japanese banks, however, the incidental credits and debts “acceptances and guarantees”
and “customers’ liability for acceptances and guarantees” are recorded in the nominal capital, and the present 
values of these items differ greatly from the book values (the nominal capital). To address this issue, in this paper
“liabilities” are defined as the book value of total liabilities minus “acceptances and guarantees.”historical volatility calculated from the daily stock prices in the applicable fiscal year
(the standard deviation of the daily rate of return). The longest analysis period
extends from the end of fiscal 1989 (March 1990) through the end of fiscal 1997
(March 1998), and thus the analyses cover a period in which Japanese stock prices
fluctuated substantially. 
A. Handling of Parameters for the Analyses
In applying the Ronn and Verma method presented above (Section III.C), two 
parameters need to be set: the option period T when the stock prices are interpreted
as options, and the market expectations of supervisors’ forbearance r. 
1. Setting of the option period
As for the option period T, taking the hypothetical case in which the liabilities of the
banks being evaluated all have the same maturity, the equity value may be interpreted
as the liquidation value following the period T, so T corresponds to the liability
maturity. In actual practice, however, bank liabilities are comprised of numerous 
liabilities with different maturities, and it is difficult to set the value of T based 
on maturity information. In this paper, making reference to prior research, the value
of  T is set a priori at one year, and this value is used consistently throughout 
the analyses. Ronn and Verma (1986) report on how the fair insurance rates are
influenced by the value of T. Their research shows that while the value of T has a
substantial influence on the absolute amount of each bank’s deposit insurance rate,
this results in virtually no change to the relative amounts of the insurance rates
charged to different banks. Consequently, the decision to set the value of T at one
year in this paper does not represent any impediment to a relative evaluation of the
fair insurance rate for each bank.
2. Setting of the forbearance expectations
The next issue is the setting of the forbearance expectations parameter r. This paper
assumes that the value of r is the same for all banks at any given point in time (that
is, the supervisory authorities do not discriminate among banks in terms of forbear-
ance), and adopts two approaches. The first approach is to assume that the value of 
r does not change over time, and (similar to the approach used for the value of T
above) to adopt a fixed value a priori. In this case, (as in the discussion of T above)
this approach is deemed valid for a cross-sectional relative valuation of fair insurance
rates. However, in conducting relative valuation in a time series, this approach is 
limited to cases in which the forbearance expectations do not change over time. 
This approach is adopted throughout the multifaceted analyses in Section B of this
chapter to determine whether or not fair insurance rates based on stock prices are
valid indicators. 
The second approach is to use new external information, and then estimate the
implied value of r based on this. In this paper, the average spread on debentures by
rating level is noted, and the value of r is estimated to minimize, overall, the gap
between each bank’s fair insurance rates and this spread. The details of this logic and
the analysis results are presented in Section C of this chapter.
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1. Influence of forbearance expectations
In this section, a fixed value is adopted for the forbearance expectations parameter r,
and the validity of the resulting estimates of fair insurance rates is examined. Before
entering into the empirical analyses, let us first examine how the estimation results
change as a result of adopting different values for r. 
Figure 1 shows the estimation results for fair insurance rates at the end of fiscal
1996 for banks rated by Moody’s by rating level. The value of r is set at six different
levels: 0.90, 0.93, 0.95, 0.97, 0.99, and 1.00. The figure shows that different values
for r result in very little change to the relative amounts of the insurance rates charged
to different banks. Thus, setting a fixed a priori value for r does not represent a prob-
lem for the examination in this chapter of whether it is possible to set insurance rates
that reflect the relative likelihood of each bank’s default. Here, the value of r is set at
0.97
20 to roughly approximate the rates currently charged under the Japanese deposit
insurance system (0.048 percent as a general insurance premium plus 0.036 percent
as a special insurance premium, for a total premium rate of 0.084 percent). The
analysis period for this section runs through March 1997 (it does not include the 
figures from the end of March 1998). The estimation of an appropriate level for the
value of ris discussed in Section C below.
2. Regarding the validity of the estimates: examinations using cross-sectional data
One of the key points of this research is to examine whether fair insurance rates 
estimated from stock prices using option pricing theory accurately reflect the actual
default probability of banks. In Japan, however, because only a small number of
banks have defaulted in the past, it is difficult to verify this statistically. As an alter-
native, this paper adopts three relative variables other than fair insurance rates that 
indicate the management conditions at each bank: (1) capital adequacy; (2) danger
points, which are defined
21 based on the “total points” for the overall bank ranking
presented annually in the journal Kin’yu Bijinesu (Financial Business) published by
Toyo Keizai Shimposha; and (3) credit ratings (Moody’s long-term deposit ratings). As
a basic approach in making the comparisons, as with the deposit insurance 
premium rate system used in the United States (as explained in Section II.C), it is
considered effective to use a mutually complementary combination of subjective and
objective judgments for the evaluation of each bank. The first choice for a subjective
judgment would be the inspection and examination results of the supervisory 
authorities, but because this is not disclosed to the public (2) the danger points and
(3) the credit ratings are adopted for the analyses as alternatives. As for objective
judgments, (1) capital adequacy (which is also used in the United States) and the fair
insurance rate (which is the main theme of this research) are utilized.
146 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
20. The value of r was also set at 0.97 in previous research in the United States and Japan (Ronn and Verma [1986],
Ikeo [1991b]), so this facilitates direct comparisons with these research efforts.
21. The “total points” for the overall bank ranking are calculated based on various management and financial
indexes, and the higher the number of “total points,” the better the bank management conditions. In this paper,
to facilitate comparison with other variables, the differentials versus the highest number of “total points” awarded
in each fiscal year are defined as “danger points,” and under this conversion the higher the number of “danger
points,” the worse the bank management conditions.147





























































































































Figure 1  Fair Insurance Rates Estimated with Different r Values
[1] r = 0.90
[2] r = 0.93
[3] r = 0.95
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[6] r = 1.00
Note: Banks rated by Moody’s, at the end of March 1997.To start with, capital adequacy categories are adopted as the objective judgment,
and the relationships of these to the danger points and the credit ratings (as subjec-
tive judgments) are presented in figures 2 and 3, respectively. The capital adequacy
categories adopted here follow the system used for setting deposit insurance premium
rates in the United States.
22
Figures 2 and 3 show a wide dispersion of both the danger points and the credit
ratings, essentially regardless of the capital adequacy categorization results (well capi-
talized, adequately capitalized, or undercapitalized). Thus, judging from these data
alone, the use of Japanese capital adequacy ratios appears to be insufficient.
23
Next, fair insurance rates are adopted as the objective judgment, and the relation-
ships versus the danger points and the credit ratings (as subjective judgments) are
presented in figures 4 and 5, respectively. As an overall trend, figures 4 and 5 show a
positive correlation between the fair insurance rates and the subjective evaluations 
at all points in time. Thus, the objective and subjective evaluation methods may be
considered as consistent overall. At the individual bank level, however, there are a 
few cases in each figure where the evaluation based on fair insurance rates is not 
consistent with the subjective evaluation. For example, in Figure 4 the danger points
of banks No. 53 and No. 54 are relatively harsh while the evaluations based on fair 
insurance rates are relatively good. Conversely, in Figure 4 the danger points of banks
No. 75, No. 76, and No. 77 are relatively good while the evaluations based on fair
insurance rates are relatively harsh. While the judgments may vary substantially in
certain cases depending upon the evaluation criteria adopted, as long as there are not
too many divergences, there is a possibility that the objective and subjective evalua-
tion methods may be mutually complementary, with each method compensating for
the weak points in the other.
149
Estimating Fair Premium Rates for Deposit Insurance Using Option Pricing Theory
22. The capital adequacy categories adopted here are defined by a combination of three criteria: (1) the capital 
(Tier 1) adequacy ratio under the Basle Agreement; (2) the capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) adequacy ratio under the
Basle Agreement; and (3) the leverage ratio (the capital [Tier 1 + Tier 2] divided by total assets). Here, financial
institutions are categorized as “well capitalized” when (1) is at least 5.0 percent, (2) is at least 9.0 percent, and 
(3) is at least 3.5 percent. Financial institutions are categorized as “adequately capitalized” when (1) is at least 
4.0 percent, (2) is at least 8.0 percent, and (3) is at least 3.0 percent. Financial institutions are categorized as
“undercapitalized” when (1) is less than 4.0 percent, (2) is less than 8.0 percent, or (3) is less than 3.0 percent.
The boundary values separating the three categories have been set for the convenience of this analysis, and do not
necessarily match those adopted by the deposit insurance system in the United States, as presented in Chapter II.
(Considering the differences between the systems in Japan and the United States, for the purposes of this research
it is convenient to set boundary values that differ from each other.)
23. In the future, however, Japanese capital adequacy ratios may become more significant with the adoption of
accounting systems that more accurately reflect actual risk, such as incorporating the results of internal audits.150 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
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Figure 2  Capital Adequacy versus Danger Points
[1] End of March 1997
[2] End of March 1996
[3] End of March 1995
Note: A total of 87 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).
Danger points are based on the evaluation of banks in Kin’yu Bijinesu.151






























































































































































Figure 3  Capital Adequacy versus Credit Ratings
[1] End of March 1997
[2] End of March 1996
[3] End of March 1995
Note: A total of 45 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).152 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
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Figure 4  Estimated Fair Insurance Rates versus Danger Points
[1] End of March 1997
[2] End of March 1996
[3] End of March 1995
Note: A total of 87 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).
Danger points are based on the evaluation of banks in Kin’yu Bijinesu.153
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Figure 5  Estimated Fair Insurance Rates versus Credit Ratings
[1] End of March 1997
[2] End of March 1996
[3] End of March 1995
Note: A total of 45 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).3. Regarding the stability of the estimates: examinations using time-series data
As combining fair insurance rates with subjective evaluations has demonstrated a 
certain validity, this section addresses the stability of the estimates of the fair insurance
rates. Out of the 87 banks analyzed for this research, six banks with relatively large
fluctuations in the rates between the end of fiscal 1989 and the end of fiscal 1996 are
selected, and the time-series transitions of their rates are presented in Figure 6. 
Looking at the results, one distinctive characteristic is that when volatility is 
calculated using the same method adopted in figures 1–5, that is, based on daily
stock price data over a one-year period (shown by the dotted lines in Figure 6), the
rate for each bank is conspicuously high at the end of fiscal 1992, protruding from
the prior and subsequent figures. As the stock price levels were not unusually low at
the end of fiscal 1992 (refer to Figure 9 below), one may surmise that this was caused
by the volatility level.
24 When the rates are revised calculating the volatility based on
the daily stock price data over a half-year period (shown by the solid lines in Figure
6), the jump seen in the dotted lines virtually disappears. The implication from this
example is that the method
25 used to calculate the volatility may have a significant
influence on the estimated rates. 
Along these lines, the shaded bars in Figure 6 indicate the size of fluctuation in the
rates shown by the solid lines in Figure 6, and the portion of this that may be attrib-
uted to changes in stock prices is indicated by the bars that are not shaded.
(Alternatively, one may interpret the difference between the shaded bars and the
unshaded bars as the contribution to the rate fluctuations from volatility.) To make an
overall judgment regarding this, it should be noted that when the individual bank
rates change significantly (such as at the end of fiscal 1996 for banks No.10, No.12,
and No.13), the contribution from changes in stock prices is relatively large, and that
the majority of what appears to be evaluation “blur” may be attributed to changes in
volatility. Of course, the causes of volatility fluctuations include bank disclosure poli-
cies, but there is a strong probability that other noise factors may also exert a significant
influence. While it is inappropriate to form a general conclusion regarding the scale of
this type of “blur” from a limited sample, based solely on the data here a “blur” of over
1.0 percent appears to be rare. Thus, if the estimated rate exceeds 1.0 percent, there is a
strong possibility of management instability factors that cannot be explained by noise
alone.
26 Conversely, in many cases rate changes of 0.1–0.2 percent can be attributed to
evaluation “blur.” The implication that may be derived from these points is that in
order to derive stable rates, the use of some sort of filter may be effective (such as 
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24. To verify this conjecture, Nikkei Stock Average data for the one-year period from April 1992 through March
1993 indicate that the market was highly volatile during the first half of fiscal 1992 (a volatility of 35.6 percent
during the first half), but that the market volatility subsided during the second half (a volatility of 19.2 percent
during the second half). Thus, there is a substantial gap between the volatility for the full fiscal year 
(28.7 percent) and that for the second half (19.2 percent).
25. Strictly speaking, the volatility that should be considered here is the future predicted volatility, but this paper
does not address technical means to improve the accuracy of volatility forecasts (for example, the possibility of
utilizing the ARCH/GARCH model, etc.), and simply adopts the historical volatility over a set period as the
future prediction for the analyses.
26. It should be noted that the 1.0 percent standard being discussed here will change depending upon the value of
the forbearance expectations parameter r. In other words, the 1.0 percent level is meaningful when the value of 
r is set at 0.97, as in this section.155
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Figure 6  Estimated Fair Insurance Rates for Selected Banks and Decomposition of Their Changes
[1] Bank No. 2
[2] Bank No. 8
[3] Bank No. 10
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[6] Bank No. 18
Note: Observation period for estimating stock price volatility is either six months or one year.setting several range categories and charging a constant rate for each category). For
example, following the analysis here, banks with estimated rates less than about 0.2
percent might be charged a low fixed rate (such as 0.0 percent) considering the likeli-
hood of evaluation error, and banks with estimated rates of 1.0 percent or higher
might be charged a different fixed rate (such as 1.0 percent) considering the likelihood
of some sort of management instability factor. The issues regarding the application of
this sort of system are discussed further in Section D below.
4. Case analyses of failed banks
Up until this point, the analysis has mostly covered banks that are still operating. 
In this section, fair insurance rates are estimated for five banks (all previously listed
on Japan’s stock exchanges) that have gone bankrupt. These rates are presented in
Figure 7. The last point on the line for each bank corresponds to the time just before
that bank failed (the banks all failed within one year from this point in time). At
these points, the estimated rates for four of the five banks are over 1.0 percent, and
the rate for the fifth bank is over 0.6 percent. Moreover, unusually high rates are 
seen not only just before the banks failed, but also one or two years prior. Four of 
the five banks show rates of at least 0.5 percent, and the rate for the fifth bank is over
0.4 percent. Thus, Figure 7 demonstrates that there were warning signs regarding the
stability of these banks at least two years before they declared bankruptcy. 
If the data for the ends of fiscal years 1996, 1995, and 1994 are plotted onto the
figures for each fiscal year in Figure 4 above, only one other bank (Bank No. 85)
27
shows rates higher than those of the five banks plotted in Figure 7. Thus, although
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Figure 7  Movements of Estimated Fair Insurance Rates for Failed Banks
27. While Bank No. 85 did not fail in terms of falling into a net debt position, it was announced in May 1998 that
the bank was subjected to a “special merger” (in October 1998) under the terms of the Deposit Insurance 
Law, and that all members of the Board of Directors with the right of representation were to resign. Thus, the
management conditions at Bank No. 85 differ from those at all the other banks that are still operating.this is ex post facto analysis, in almost every case it was possible to distinguish 
the banks that failed from those that did not at least one to two years prior to the
bank failures. 
C. Fair Premium Rates for Deposit Insurance Based on Estimations 
of Forbearance Expectations
1. Necessity of estimating forbearance expectations
In Section B, r is set at a fixed value of 0.97 and fair insurance rates are estimated
through the end of March 1997 (the end of fiscal 1996). Here, leaving the value of r
at 0.97, the fair insurance rates are estimated for all 87 banks through the end of
March 1998 (the end of fiscal 1997). The results are presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows that the estimated rates for many of the banks increased sharply
over the one-year period through the end of March 1998. Does this indicate that the
banks’ management conditions and the contents of their assets suddenly deteriorated
(or that the deterioration suddenly became clear) during this one-year period?
Intuitively, it seems that some other factor is required to explain such a remarkable
change. One possibility is that this development might be due to a change in market
participants’ expectations of forbearance by the supervisory authorities. To verify this,
the upper chart in Figure 9 presents the daily data of the Bank Stock Price Index
(Tokyo Stock Exchange) and the Nikkei Stock Average from April 1, 1996 through
April 28, 1998. Several of the conspicuous declines in the Bank Stock Price Index
correspond to announcements of bank failures or of radical restructuring plans
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Figure 8  Movements of Estimated Fair Insurance Rates for 87 Banks
Note: Estimated without adjustment for changes of expected forbearance (r is fixed at 0.97).159
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Note: The upper chart contains daily data from April 1, 1996 to April 28, 1998.
The lower chart contains end-of-fiscal-year data from fiscal 1988 to 1997.
Figure 9  Movements of the Bank Stock Price Index and the Nikkei Stock Average
including the curtailment of business activities, that is to say, periods when the 
supervisory authorities took harsh measures toward banks suffering from poor 
management conditions. (These include the announcements of restructuring at
Nippon Credit Bank and the planned merger of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in early April 1997 as well as announcements concerning the failures of Kyoto Kyoei
Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Tokuyo City Bank in October–November
1997.) Thus, there is a strong likelihood that the forbearance expectations did in 
fact change.
2. Estimation of forbearance expectations
If the changes in forbearance expectations (deduced above) are significant, as 
discussed in Section A above, it is necessary to estimate the value of the forbearance
parameter r at each point in time and then to calculate the fair insurance rates using
these values of r. In this section, the value of r is estimated using historical data for
the bond spread by credit rating.
The basic assumption for this estimation is that, although credit rating data 
are inferior to stock price data at the individual bank level, they are relatively inde-
pendent from forbearance expectations. Thus, credit rating data are effective for
judging the average management conditions when placing many banks into sets. 
In other words, bank stock price data incorporate more information than rating data
about management conditions at the individual bank level, but the problem is that
bank stock price data also incorporate changes in forbearance expectations. If one
accepts that the stock market pricing mechanism is rational and efficient, then this
assumption is natural.
The specific procedure for estimating the value of r is as follows. First, the fair
rates are calculated for all banks rated by Moody’s at the end of each fiscal year for 
six different values of r (1.00, 0.99, 0.97, 0.95, 0.93, and 0.90). Second, based on
historical data for the bond spread by rating (as shown in Table 2),
28 the average
spread over Aaa bonds is calculated for each rating.
29 Noting the differential between
the fair rates for each bank calculated above and the average spread for each corre-
sponding rating, the sum of the squares for each differential is sought for each value
of r, and the results are presented in Table 3. The final step is to seek the values of 
r that minimize the sum of the squares at each point in time. In this analysis, as 
an approximation, a quadratic function is applied to the value of r (from among 
the six values of r) that results in the smallest sum of the squares and to the two 
values on both its sides (these three figures are shown in the shaded areas of Table 3)
to estimate rmin, which minimizes the sum of the squares. 
The results indicate that the forbearance expectations increased slightly during 
the one-year period from the end of March 1996 through the end of March 1997
(the increase in rmin was 0.007), but then increased sharply during the one-year
period from the end of March 1997 through the end of March 1998 (the increase in
rmin was 0.022, about three times the increase during the previous year).
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28. The bond spread data used here (Table 2) are taken from the historical data presented by Cantor, Packer, and
Cole (1997). These are the average spreads for 4,399 U.S. bond issues from January 1983 through July 1993 (the
ratings used are from both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s). 
29. The bond spread is composed of the expected loss and the risk premium. Because the fair insurance rates covered
in this analysis correspond to the expected loss, for comparison the risk premium must be subtracted from the
bond spread. This analysis assumes that the risk premium is approximately uniform without referring to the 
rating, and that the Aaa bond spread is essentially the same as the risk premium (in other words, the expected loss
on bonds rated Aaa is zero). As a result, it is possible to compare the average spread over Aaa bonds for each 
rating with the estimated fair insurance rates.3. Fair premium rates for deposit insurance based on estimations of forbearance
expectations
Here, new calculations are made for a portion of the analyses conducted in Section B
utilizing the rmin values estimated above. The rmin values from Table 3 are used in
place of r = 0.97 for the data from the end of fiscal 1994 (March 1995) through the
end of fiscal 1997 (March 1998), which are presented in Figure 8 above. The results
are presented in Figure 10. In this figure, the changes in the rates for each bank from
the end of fiscal 1996 to the end of fiscal 1997 show both increases and decreases,
avoiding the extreme results in Figure 8, where almost all of the rates declined. As
there is no method to directly verify whether the results in Figure 8 or those in Figure
10 more closely approximate “truly fair insurance rates,” to some extent this must be
left up to the subjective judgment of individuals (or of the supervisory authorities or
other groups that may have access to superior information).
30 In terms of the changes
in management conditions over this one-year period, however, it appears that the
results in Figure 10 are more accurate.
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Table 2  Average Bond Spread by Credit Rating
Table 3  Sum of Squares for Each Differential between the Estimated Fair Insurance
Rate and the Average Spread by Rating
r 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.90 rmin
End of March 1995 16.21 16.13 14.45 8.99 30.09 322.19 0.956
End of March 1996 19.23 19.07 16.45 9.57 28.74 292.39 0.955
End of March 1997 20.28 19.87 14.60 15.25 81.62 557.63 0.962
End of March 1998 16.56 14.32 15.32 53.78 211.63 915.36 0.984
Note: rmin is defined as the r value that minimizes the sum of squares.
30. For example, by examining the correlation between the rates for each bank shown in Figure 10 and management
information about the individual banks, it might be possible to confirm the accuracy of the estimation 
results. However, this paper does not enter into any analyses of microeconomic information concerning the 
individual banks.D. Considerations Regarding the Practical Utility of Fair Premium Rates 
for Deposit Insurance
1. One example of an administrative system
The implications in this chapter regarding the possibility of setting variable deposit
insurance premiums can be summarized as follows.
(1) At the very least, fair insurance rate data based on individual stock prices function
effectively to reinforce other evaluation methods (the bank examination results of
the supervisory authorities, credit ratings, etc.). Therefore, it is worthwhile
considering a system that combines these fair insurance rates with the results of
such subjective evaluations.
(2) Fair insurance rate data incorporate a certain level of error due to volatility
“blur” and other factors. Accordingly, to ensure stable system administration,
the use of some sort of filter (such as grouping the banks into several classes
based on the range of the estimated fair rates) should be considered.
(3) In markets where the forbearance expectations may have changed, it is necessary
to adjust the value of r to account for the effect of such changes.
In this section, one hypothetical administrative system is presented based on these
implications. (This research is not conducted for the purpose of presenting any 
concrete policy proposals; this example is presented solely to provide an image of
such a system.) First, the fair insurance rates adjusted for forbearance expectations are
grouped into three range categories: less than 0.2 percent, 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent,
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Figure 10  Movements of Estimated Fair Insurance Rates for 87 Banks
Note: Rates from fiscal 1995 through 1997 are estimated with adjustment for changes of expected
forbearance (using rmin shown in Table 3).
Bank identification numbers appear in the chart.and 1.0 percent or higher. Similarly, the credit ratings (used as a substitute for the
evaluations of the supervisory authorities) are also grouped into three range 
categories: A3 or higher, Baa1–2, and Baa3 or lower. These two types of information
define a 3 ´ 3 matrix, and five insurance rate categories are set as shown in Figure 11
(also see Table 4). Figure 12 presents the results for the banks rated by Moody’s at
each point in time from the end of fiscal 1994 (March 1995) through the end of fis-
cal 1997 (March 1998). In this figure, the percentages presented in each cell indicate
the ratio of the number of banks in that cell to the total number. Table 4 presents the
percentage of banks that would have been charged the five different insurance rate
categories presented in Figure 11 during each of the four fiscal years. Table 4 shows
that using this administrative system the percentage of banks in category No.1
through No. 3 is flat or gradually declining, while the percentage of banks in category
No. 4 and No. 5 is gradually increasing. In order to judge whether this result is 
appropriate, a micro-level discussion of the fairness of the rates charged to each 
individual bank would be unavoidable. In terms of the overall trend, however, the
results may be considered relatively consistent with the actual situation.
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Figure 11  An Example of Insurance Rate Categories Based on a 3 ´ 3 Matrix
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Table 4  Percentage of Banks in Each Insurance Rate Category
Percent
March 1995 March 1996 March 1997 March 1998
Insurance rate category No. 1 51.1 46.7 44.4 42.6
Insurance rate category No. 2 28.9 33.3 33.3 31.9
Insurance rate category No. 3 17.8 11.1 8.9 8.5
Insurance rate category No. 4 2.2 6.7 8.9 10.6
Insurance rate category No. 5 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4
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Figure 12  Estimated Fair Insurance Rates versus Credit Ratings
[1] End of March 1998 (rmin = 0.984)
[2] End of March 1997 (rmin = 0.962)
Note: A total of 45–48 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).
Estimated with adjustment for changes of expected forbearance (using rmin shown in Table 3).165
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[4] End of March 1995 (rmin = 0.956)
Note: A total of 45–48 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).
Estimated with adjustment for changes of expected forbearance (using rmin shown in Table 3).2. Payment burden for fair insurance rates
This empirical analysis concludes with an examination of the scale of the premium
payment burden for banks if fair insurance rates are implemented.
As an analytical method, first the average net operating profit from the end of
March 1995 through the end of March 1997 is calculated for each of the 87 banks.
Second, the average premium payment during the same period is calculated for each
bank, which is then expressed in terms of the percentage versus the average net 
operating profit. Here, the premium payment is derived by multiplying the total
amount of insured deposits by the insurance rate defined as follows.
(1) A flat rate of 0.084 percent is charged to all banks (the rate presently charged
in Japan).
(2) An estimated fair insurance rate is charged to each bank (after adjusting 
forbearance expectations).
(3) Estimated fair insurance rates (after adjusting forbearance expectations) are
grouped into three range categories (less than 0.2 percent, 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent,
and 1.0 percent or higher), and the rates charged to banks in each category are the
lowest rate for that category (0.0 percent, 0.2 percent, and 1.0 percent).
The percentage for each bank is plotted, against the average fair insurance rate, for
each of the above three cases in Figure 13.
Looking at Figure 13, in case (1), where a flat rate is charged to all the banks, the scale
of the premium payment burden falls into a relatively narrow range regardless of each
bank’s management condition as expressed by estimated fair insurance rates. (For
most banks, the burden as a percentage against net operating profit is approximately 
10 percent, and the maximum burden is less than 20 percent.) In case (2), where the fair
insurance rates are charged directly, the worse the management conditions, the
greater the premium payment burden. For example, for banks with a fair insurance rate
of over 0.5 percent, the burden as a percentage against net operating profit is at least
around 40 percent. In case (3), there is no premium payment burden for banks with a
fair insurance rate of less than 0.2 percent, the burden for banks with a fair insurance rate
of 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent averages slightly over 20 percent, and the burden for banks
with a fair insurance rate of 1.0 percent or higher (three banks) exceeds 100 percent of
the net operating profit. When case (3) functions ideally, it should be possible to create
a framework whereby banks with highly sound financial conditions will not be obligated
to bear excessive premium payment burdens, while banks with exceedingly poor
management conditions will be pressed to withdraw from the deposit business, and banks
with questionable management conditions will bear appropriate burdens in line with their
management status.
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Figure 13  Deposit Insurance Premium Burden as the Percentage versus Net Operating Profit
[1] Applying a Flat Rate of 0.084 Percent to All Banks
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Note: Bank deposit insurance premiums and net operating profits are evaluated as the average from
the end of March 1995 to 1997.
Fair insurance rates (horizontal axis) are estimated with adjustment for changes in expected
forbearance.
A total of 87 banks are covered (bank identification numbers appear in the charts).
[2] Applying the Estimated Fair Insurance Rate to Each Bank
[3] Applying One of the Three Rates in Accordance with the Three Range Categories of Fair Insurance RatesV. Conclusion
As a contribution to the general issue of whether or not a variable insurance rate system
should be introduced, the analysis in this paper has focused on the feasibility of estimating
fair insurance rates using option pricing theory based on stock price information.
This paper has also identified administrative issues that need to be considered if such a
system were actually adopted for deposit insurance. Thus, this paper does not provide
exhaustive coverage of the issues that need to be addressed in policy decisions regarding
the ideal deposit insurance system. Rather, it is simply an in-depth examination of one
technical field. The author hopes that the merits and demerits of a variable rate system
will be debated from a wider perspective, and would like to point out three items
noted during this research.
(1) While it is difficult to assess the bankruptcy risk of individual banks with perfect
accuracy, the methods introduced in this paper may well have limited value, for
example, in identifying banks that are in an extremely dangerous condition.
(2) Flat rate insurance systems not only represent a moral hazard for banks suffering
poor management conditions, but they also force sound banks to bear the
burden of disproportionately high premiums relative to the actual risk, and
the overall costs to Japan’s banking system cannot be ignored. Thus, examinations
of introducing a system of fair insurance rates should be initiated promptly.
(3) In this paper, the option pricing approach using stock price information 
has been considered within the framework of deposit insurance rates, but 
this approach may also prove effective as a supplementary method for the
monitoring of corporate management by general investors and the monitoring
of bank management by the supervisory authorities.
There remain several outstanding issues for future consideration that were not
covered by the analyses in this paper.
(1) Sufficient considerations must be given to fairness and accuracy. Accordingly,
further research should be conducted on the accuracy of the estimation results
and the valuation of the measurement error. Additional research should also
be conducted on the specific methods of filtering (grouping) in setting the
insurance rates.
(2) In connection with the incompleteness of information, the issue of whether
the fair insurance rate estimation results should be disclosed (and whether this
might result in bank runs) should be examined.
(3) Consideration must be given to objectivity and transparency. Accordingly, the
rules for calculating the insurance rates should be defined by fixed formulas,
and there are certain benefits to be obtained by avoiding excessively complex
calculation methods.
(4) The effects of utilizing a combination of fair insurance rates together with the
bank examination results of the supervisory authorities (instead of the credit
ratings and other public data employed in this analysis) need to be verified.
(5) Further research should also be conducted on the effects of using average stock
prices during the analysis intervals (instead of the stock prices at the end of
each fiscal year as employed in this paper).
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In considering the ideal form for the deposit insurance system, there are a great
many policy issues that need to be examined aside from the technical points that 
are the primary topics of this paper, and one can easily understand that the process
leading to a change in the insurance system will not be simple. Nevertheless, the 
prudential policy with regard to Japan’s financial system has recently become a topic 
of widespread debate, and the opportunities to discuss the merits and demerits of
introducing a variable rate system are increasing. Greater awareness of this issue will
contribute to this reform process and promote the establishment of a better system.170 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
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